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PRICE CONTROL AND THE EMERGENCY
PRICE CONTROL ACT
INTRODUCTION
WHEN the United States Government launched its great
defense and Lend-Lease programs it also unwittingly
launched the nation on the road to a disastrous inflation. In
ordinary times price keeps supply and demand in equality
with each other. It also brings about increases or decreases in
production and regulates the distribution of goods. During a
period when the financial resources of the Government are
thrown onto the market, however, and when the Government
will purchase irrespective of price, the demand both for goods
and labor will exceed the supply. The ordinary laws of eco-
nomics cannot cope with such an unnatural situation. Price
remains no longer a deterrent to demand f6r either goods or
services. The result is an ever spiraling inflation.
The first to suffer from this unnatural condition is the
person on a fixed income or salary. Included in such a group
must be those whose income, in whole or in part, is from
interest on savings or from endowments. In a very true sense
anyone with life insurance is also a sufferer.
The next to be penalized by this inflation is the Govern-
ment, which is indirectly everyone. A nation at war must have
arms and supplies. Price can be but of a secondary considera-
tion. Government with its virtually unlimited purchasing
power will purchase what it needs regardless of the astro-
nomical figures to which prices have ascended. What does this
mean? It means that every billion dollars raised by taxation
or by the sale of bonds will purchase less of the things neces-
sary to wage war. It means our national debt will be unneces-
sarily high. It means a debt which arose when money is cheap
but which wilL-be paid when money is dear.
Serious though the results of such an inflation may be
during the war, the results will be more serious still after the
war. When the demand for goods of destruction ceases we
will face a dangerous lull.
This was true after the last war, and today, with a much
higher percentage of the nation geared to a wartime economy,
it will be even more true. A study of business recessions will
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show that the greater the inflation, the greater the depression
to follow.
To aid in preventing this inflation Congress on January
30, 1942, passed the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 1
In order to understand better this Act, its more salient sec-
tions will be briefly summarized.
Section 1 (a) sets out the purposes of the act as being to
stabilize prices, prevent speculative, unwarranted and
abnormal increases in prices and rents; to prevent hoarding,
profiteering, and other disruptive practices resulting from
abnormal market conditions; to prevent dissipation of defense
appropriations by excessive prices; to prevent undue hard-
ships on those dependent upon set incomes; to assist in secur-
ing adequate production and to prevent a post emergency
collapse.
Section 2 (a) in general empowers the Administrator to
control prices whenever in his judgment the price of a com-
modity has risen or threatens to rise to such an extent as to
defeat the purpose of the act. Such prices shall be such as
shall in his judgment be generally fair and equitable. The
administrator, in setting a price, shall give due consideration
to the price prevailing between October 1 and October 15,
1941. This section requires that a maximum price regulation
be accompanied by a statement of. the considerations involved
in its issuance, and permits the issuance of temporary maxi-
mum price regulations, effective for no more than 60 days,
which may freeze the prices prevailing for any commodity
within five days prior to the date of issuance of the regulation.
Section 2 (b) empowers the administrator to set rentals
and makes April 1, 1941, the base date upon which he, as
nearly as practicable, should set the rates.
Section 2 (e) empowers the administrator to, whenever
he determines that the maximum necessary production of the
commodity is not being obtained, on behalf of the United
States, without regard to the provisions of law requiring
competitive bidding, buy or sell at public or private sale, or
store or use, such commodity in such a manner as he deter-
1 50 U.S.C.A. App. Sec. 901-946.
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mines to be necessary to obtain the maximum necessary
production.
Section 3 (a) limits the administrator in setting prices
on farm products.
Section 201 creates an office of Price Administration and
empowers the President to appoint an administrator.
Section 202 authorizes the administrator to make studies
and investigations and to obtain such information as he con-
siders necessary in prescribing any regulation or order; to
require any person engaged in the business of dealing with
any commodity or in the rental of housing accommodations
to furnish all necessary information, to keep records and
make reports.
Section 203 provides for the manner of protesting a regu-
lation set-up by the administrator.
Section 204 provides for an Emergency Court of Appeals.
This court is to be made up of three or more judges appointed
by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court and
from among the judges of the United States district and
circuit courts.
Section 205 provides for the penalties and methods of
enforcing the provisions of this Act.
Because of the revolutionary nature of this Act serious
questions as to its constitutionality of price control in general,
and of the Emergency Price Control Act in particular.
EMINENT DOMAIN
In considering the constitutionality of price fixing one
must first determine whether it is being predicated upon. the
Government's power of Eminent Domain or upon the Gov-
ernment's power to regulate. If price fixing can .be said to
arise under the power of Eminent Domain the problem of
"due process" is immediately encountered. To determine which
doctrine has been followed on the question of price fixing we
must turn our attention to Government fixing of public utili-
ties rates. In Smyth v. Ames 2 it was held that while the state
2 169 U.S. 466, 42 L. Ed. 819 (1898).
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could fix rates for intrastate railroads these rates must yield
a fair return. The courts have generally followed this decision
in dealing with rate fixing of public utilities.
Thus while rate making is in one sense considered a regu-
lation and is usually construed to be a right arising from the
commerce clause 3 the courts have nevertheless insisted on a
fair return. In this respect rate making has assumed an aspect
of eminent domain proceedings. In Acker v. United States,4
however, it was held that a uniform rate on an entire group
would be valid if compensatory to a reasonable number. While
theory of a reasonable return may have application in the
case of public utilities there is a serious question as to its
application to price fixing generally or to businesses not
cloaked with a public interest. In Hegeman corporation v.
Baldwin,5 Justice Cardoza distinguished between a public
utility and a competitive business in that while the utility
must continue at a loss the private business may withdraw.
In Nebbis v. New York 6 a case arising over a New York
statute setting prices on milk the court emphasized the right
of regulation, and asserted that due process merely demanded
that the law should not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capri-
cious, and that the means selected should have a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained. In
this decision the court refuted the contention that control of
prices is per se unreasonable and unconstitutional. In this de-
cision the court refers back to one of the oldest decisions of
price fixing, Munn v. Illinois.7 It was in this case that the
theory of regulation was fostered, but it was in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Field that the doctrine of "reasonable
return" was established. It has been due to the following of
this doctrine that the power of regulation has in many cases
become confused with the right of a "fair value" under
eminent domain.
There is a clear distinction between control wherein the
effort is directed on at lowering price and control which is
3 U. S. Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8, Par. 3.
4 298 U. S. 426, 80 L. Ed. 1257 (1936). See alsoTagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United
States 280 U. S. 420, 74 L. Ed. 524 (1930).
5 293 U. S. 163, 79 L. Ed. 259 (1934).
6 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934).
7 94 U. S. 113, 20 L. Ed. 77 (18t7).
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directed at the havoc to the economy of the nation resulting
from distorted prices.8 The former is directed at the profits of
a'business. In the latter, the effect upon a business is indirect
and unintentional. Such regulation by both the State and
Federal Governments has been upheld in recent years.9
While there is an element of the theory of Eminent Domain
when the Government sets prices on the goods of which it is
to be a purchaser, there can be no such corollary when the
Government is fixing prices generally. The government gains
nothing by the transactions among individuals. We must con-
clude therefore that if the Government has the power to fix
prices it must be contingent upon one or several of the Gov-
ernment's regulatory powers.
WAR POWERS
When we consider price fixing as a regulatory function
of Congress we must consider under just what power of
Congress this regulation can be upheld. The power under
which price fixing can be most easily maintained appears to
be under the "War Powers." The War Powers are contained
in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Clause 1 of this
section states that Congress shall have power to lay and col-
lect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States. Clauses 11 to 17 empowers Congress to "de-
clare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal and make rules
concerning captures on land and water; to raise and support
armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be
for a longer term than two years; to provide and maintain a
navy; to make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces; to provide for calling forth the militia
to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and
repel invasions; to provide for organizing, arming and disci-
plining the militia, and for governing such part of them as
may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving
to the States respectively the appointment of the officers and
the authority of training the militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress. Clause 18 empowers Congress to
8 Price Control in War and Emergency, 90 Univ. of Penn. Law Review 675.
9 Nebbie v. New York, 291 U. S. 163, 79 L. Ed. 259 (1934). Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 84 L. Ed. 1263 (1940).
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"make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carry-
ing into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or officer thereof."
The Federal Government is a government of delegated
powers. If it is to regulate it must do so by the exercise of
one of these powers. The war power is the most far-reaching
of all powers delegated to Congress. It is an authority which
is always present but which can only operate in an emergency.
This power in no way abrogates the restrictions of the Con-
stitution, but it, like the commerce clause or any other power
given to Congress, makes possible legislation which without
this grant of power would be unconstitutional. We must inves-
tigate, however, the extent to which Congress can go in the
exercise of the War Powers. In United States v. MacIntosh,' 0
a case arising under the Lever Act of the last war,"1 Justice
Sutherland in giving the opinion of the court stated:
From its very nature the war powers, when necessity calls for
its exercise, tolerates no qualifications or limitations, unless found
in the Constitution or in applicable principles of International
Law. In the words of John Quincy Adams, 'this power is tremend-
ous; it is strictly constitutional; but it breaks down every barrier
so anxiously erected for the protection of liberty, property and
of life.' To the end that war may not result in defeat, freedom of
speech may, by Act of Congress, be curtailed or denied so that
the morale of the people and the spirit of the Army may not be
broken by seditious utterances; freedom of the press curtailed to
preserve our military plans and movements from the knowledge
of the enemy; deserters and spies put to death without indictment-
or trial by jury; ships and supplies requisitioned; property of
alien enemies, theretofore under the protection of the Constitution,
siezed without process and converted to the public use without due
process of law in the ordinary sense of the world; prices of food
and other necessities of life fixed or regulated; railroads taken
over and operated by the government; and other powers wholly
inadmissible in time of peace, exercised to meet the emergencies
of war.
In Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,12 a
case dealing with the Minnesota Moratorium Act, the court
in speaking of the powers of the Federal Government stated:
10 283 U. S. 605, 75 L. Ed. 1302 (1931).
11 Food and Fuel Control Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 276, as amended 1919, 41 Stat. 297.
12 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. Ed. 413 (1934). See also Address by Justice Hughes "The
Fighting Power of the U. S. under the Constitution." Cong. Record Vol. 55 (65th
Congress, 1st Session) Part 8 Appendix, p. 551.
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The War Power of the Federal Government is not created by
the emergency of war, but it is a power to meet that emergency.
It is a power to wage war successfully and thus it permits the
harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a supreme
cooperative effort to preserve the nation.
The right of the Federal Government to regulate the price
of coal during World War No. 1 was upheld in DuPont Co.
v. Hughes 13 and by the Supreme Court in Highlands v. Rus-
sell Car and Snow Plow Co.14 The Lever Act15 under which
these two cases arose gives us the best precedent for price
fixing under the War powers. It also shows us that broad
though the war powers be, they do not destroy constitutional
barriers.16
Section 4 of the Lever Act Stated:
That it is herby made unlawful for any person wilfully-to
mak any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or
dealing in or with any necessaries; to conspire, combine, agree or
arrange with any other person- (e) to exact excessive prices for
any necessaries.
In declaring this portion of the act unconstitutional in
U. S. v. Cohen, the lower court stated:
Congress alone has power to define crimes against the United
States. This power cannot be delegated to the juries of this
country-therefore, because the law is vague, -indefinite, and
uncertain, and because it fixes no immutable standards of guilt,
but leaves such standards to the variant views of the different
courts and juries which may be called upon to enforce it, and
because it does not inform defendant of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him,'I think it is constitutionally invalid.
Thus we can see that, though the War Powers gives Con-
gress a broad leeway in enacting regulatory legislation, it
cannot enact legislation, it cannot enact legislation prohibited
by other sections of the constitution. This particular section
set up no standards as was done in other sections of the state.
In view of the many cases decided-under the Lever Act and
in view of power of Congress to draft men for military ser-
13 50 Fed. 2d 821 (1931).
14 279 U. S. 253, 73 L. Ed. 688 (1929).
15 40 Stat 276; as amended 1919, 41 Stat. 297.
16 Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866). Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries & warehouse Co. 251 U. S. 146, 64 L. Ed. 194 (1919).
17 264 F. 218 (1920) affirmed 225 U. S. 82, 65 L. Ed. 516 (1921).
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vice,1 8 to seize railroads,1 9 and to do nearly anything neces-
sary to properly wage war under the War Powers there can be
no question but that even a wide spread price fixing program
can likewise be maintained.
CURRENCY POWER AND COMMERCE CLAUSE
Having determined that price control could be maintained
under the Par Powers, we now turn our attention to the possi-
bility of its being maintained without asserting this War
Power. In searching for another power of Congress upon
which price fixing might be established it seems well to con-
sider two oft-related powers, the Currency Power 20 and the
Commerce Clause.2 1
The Constitution confers upon Congress the power to make
all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution all
powers vested in it22
In the exercise of the Implied powers it has long been
established that Congress is not limited to such measures as
are indispensibly necessary to give effect to its expressed
powers, but, in the exercise of its discretion as to the means
of carrying them into execution, may adopt any means appear-
ing to it most feasible and appropriate, which are suited to
the end to be accomplished, and consistent with the provisions
of the constitution.2 3
It was under the Currency power that the oft-denounced
United States bank was upheld.24 In the Legal Tender cases 25
the right of Congress to make paper legal currency was upheld.
In the now famous Gold Clause cases of 1934 26 the cur-
18 Local Draft Board No. 1 v. Connors, 124 Fed. 2d 388 (1941). U. S. v. Schwim-
mer, 279 U. S. 644; 73 L. Ed. 887 (1929). Arner v. U. S. 245 U,' S, 366; 62 L, Ed,
349 (1918).
19 St. Louis, K. & S. E. R. Co. v. United States, 267 U. S, 346, 69 L, E, 649
(1925); Northern Pacific 1. F. Co. v. N. Dakota, 250 U. S. 135, 63 Fed. 897 (1919).
20 U. S. Constitution Art. I Section 8, Par. 5.
21 U. S. Constitution Art. I Section 8, Par. 3.
22 Article I Section 8, Par. 5 U. S. Constitution.
23 Champion v. Ames. 188 U. S. 321, 47 L. E. 492 (1903): Martin v. Hunter 1
Wheat. 304, 4 L. Ed. 97; (1816). Legal Tender Cases, 110 U. S. 421, 28 L. Ed. 204
(1884). -
24 McCullough v. Maryland 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
25 12 Wall. 457, 20 L. Ed. 287; See also Dooley v. Smith, 13. Wall. 604, 20
L. Ed. 547 (1872).
26 Normal v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Rt. Co. 294 U. S. 240 79 L. Ed. 885 (1935).
Nortz v. United States, 294 U. S. 317, 79 L. MI. 907 (1935).
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rency power was recognized as includiig the power to lower
the metal content of the dollar in order to stimulate prices.
"The value thereof" as a-result of these cases came to mean
"value" in the sense of purchasing power. 2 7 If Congress can
regulate the value of money then price control, which would
assist in regulating the value of money, by preventing infla-
tion and stabilizing purchase prices, would be a valid exercise
of the regulatory power.
Probably no clause in the Constitution has been broadened
in the meaning to the extent that the "Commerce Clause" 28
has, particularly in recent years. In one of the first important
cases to arise under the Commerce Clause Chief Justice
Marshall said:
"Commerce undoubtedly is traffic, but it is something more
-it is intercourse."
Chief Justice Marshall stated further that "among the
states" meant "that commerce which concerns more states
than one." 29 It does not, therefore, merely mean interstate
commerce as distinguished from intrastate commerce. 30 For
many years after this decision the commerce clause had been
.narrowly construed to apply to little more than transporta-
tion.3 1 A shift away from this narrow interpretation com-
menced with Swift and Company v. United States 32 and is
becoming more definite with each passing year. In a frequently
quoted dissenting opinion in the Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 3 3
case Justice Cardoza stated that the Bituminous Coal Conser-
vation Act of 1935 which regulated prices on bituminous coal
was within the power of the Central Government insofar as
it provides for minimum prices upon sales of bituminous coal
in the transactions of interstate commerce and in those of
intrastate commerce where interstate commerce is directly
or indirectly affected. While this Act was declared unconsti-
tutional due to an invalid tax, a substitute measure 34 was
quickly passed and was upheld in Sunshine Anthracite Coal
27 Constitution and 'What it Means Today, Edwin S. Corwin, 1937.
28 Article I, Section 8, Par. 3 U. S. Constitution.
29 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
30 Constitution and What it Means Today.
31 United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U. S. 1 39 L. Ed. 325 (1894),
32 196 U. S. 375, 49 L. Ed. 518 (1905).
33 298 U. S. 238. 80 L. Ed. 1160-(1936).
34 Bituminous Coal Act of 1937.
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Co. v. Adkins.35 Price Control is one of the means available
to the States or to Congress within its domain for the protec-
tion and promotion of the welfare of the economy.
36
In U. S. v. Darby Lumber Company 37 the court overthrew
the famous Hammer v. Dagenhart decision 38 and held that
Congress could prohibit Chill Labor in Interstate Commerce.
In Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40,39 the court
held that under the Commerce Clause Congress could require
collective bargaining between interstate carriers and their
employees. Under the National Labor Relations Act 40 this
right was extended to all engaged in interstate commerce.
When we observe the price control that has been upheld
in the case of bituminous coal and when we observe further
that under the power to regulate commerce Congress has
prohibited child labor, set wage and hour standards, and set
up a system of collective bargaining there can be virtually
no question but that Congress could regulate prices under the
"commerce clause."
Upon determining this we must observe, however, that if
price control were to be predicate upon the commerce power
it would be more limited in scope than if it were to be predi-
cated upon the commerce power it would be more limited in
scope than if it were to be predicated upon the War Powers
or Currency control powers. On the other hand we must
likewise observe the ever expanding scope of the commerce
clause. We must particularly observe the interpretation of
interstate commerce found in Labor Relations and wage and
hour cases.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin
Steel Company,41 the court stated:
The Congressional authority to protect interstate commerce
from burdens and obstructions is not limited to transactions which
can be deemed to be an essential part of a flow of interstate or
foreign commerce. Burdens and obstructions may be due to injur-
35 310 U. S. 381, 84 L. Ed. 1263 (1939).
36 291 U. S. 502, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934).
37 312 U. S. 100, 85 L. E. 609 (1941).
38 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. Ed. 1101, (1918).
39 300 U. S. 515, 81 L. Ed. 789 (1937).
40 29 U. S. C. A. §151.
41 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. E. 893 (1936).
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ious actions springing from other sources. The fundamental prin-
ciple is that the power to regulate interstate commerce is the power
to enact all appropriate legislation for its protection and ad-
vancement. Although activities may be intrastate in character
when separately considered, if they have such a close and sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens
and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exer-
cise that control.
The court also stated in this case that:
Such injurious action burdening and obstructing interstate
commerce may spring from labor disputes irrespective of the
origin of the materials used in the manufacturing process. The
place where the manufacturer makes his sales is not controlling
if the sales in fact are in interstate commerce.
In United States v. Darby Lumber Company 42 the court
stated that:
While manufacture is not of itself interstate commerce the
interstate shipment of manufactured goods is such commerce and
the prohibition of such shipment by Congress is indubitably a
regulation of Congress.
The power to regulate commerce is the power to prescribe the
rules by which commerce is governed.43
It extends not only to those regulations which aid, foster,
and protect commerce but embraces those which prohibit it.44
Considering the broad scope of interstate commerce as
indicated by these recent decisions it is evident that a price
control could be predicated upon the commerce clause which
could regulate a high percentage of our commercial transac-
tions.
Having determined that price control is within the powers
of Congress we must determine if there is any restriction of
the exercise of this control by Congress. Any legislation
enacted by Congress is restricted by due process, 45 but the
power of Congress to pass legislation under its particular
grants of power is curtailed by due process of law to no
greater extent than are the states in the exercise of their police
42 312 U. S. 100, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941).
43 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
44 Lottery cases, 188 U. S. 321, (1903).
45 Amendment V, U. S. Constitution.
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power. In Nebbia v. New York46 the court in speaking of
the restriction of due process stated:
The Fifth Amendment in the field of Federal activity, and the
Fourteenth as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental
regulation for the public welfare. They merely condition the exer-
cise of the admitted power, by securing that the end shall be
accomplished by methods consistent with due process. And the
guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only
that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary capricious, and
that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation
to the object sought to be attained.
A bill would not be unreasonable merely because the prices
set made it impossible for one or a few in a certain business
to continue to operate at a profit. The legislation is general
and not specific.
In Highland v. Russell Car and Snow Plow Company,48
a case arising under the Lever Act 49 of the first World War,
it was held that price fixing of coal by congress may be exer-
cised where the public interest requires such protection to
prevent inflation. In Block v. Hirsch 50 rent regulations for
the District of Columbia established under the War Powers
was likewise upheld.
Having determined that the end of price control is legiti-
mate and legislation will not be contrary to due process if it
is a reasonable means of attaining this end, we will now con-
sider the specific legislative enactment which is now the law
of the land.51
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EMERGENCY
PRICE CONTROL ACT
The constitutionality of the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942 might, of course, be challenged upon many grounds.
The most important of these are, however, under due process
as to its reasonableness and as to procedure and under delega-
tion of legislative power. At this writing the only case per-
taining to the constitutionality of this law to be adjudicated
46 291 U. S. 502.
48 279 U. S. 253, 73 L. Ed. 688 (1929).
49 U. S. C. A Title 50, App Sec. 901.
50 256 U. S. 135, 65 L. Ed. 865 (1921).
51 50 U. S. CAA. App. § 901.
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by the United States Supreme Court was disposed of upon a
jurisdictional question and so the constitutionality of this
measure was not determined by this body.52 Several lower
court decisions, however, will be considered in viewing the
constitutionality of this enactment.
The present price control statute is founded upon the war
powers. This power, which in time of peace is dormant,
becomes in time of war a strong legislative factor. Thus in
Home Building and Loan Association v. Bladisdell 53 the court
said:
Although an emergency may not call into life a power which
has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for
the exertion of a living power already enjoyed.54 The Constitu-
tional question presented in the light of an emergency is whether
the power possessed embraces the particular exercise of it in
response to particular conditions. Thus, the war power of the
federal government is not created by the emergency of war, but
it is a power to wage war successfully, and thus it permits the
harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a supreme
co-operative effort to preserve the nation. But even the war power
does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential
liberties.
In Henderson v. Kimmel, 5 5 a case arising under rent con-
trol sections of the present act the court in maintaining that
the rent provision did not violate due process, note the sim-
ilarity in wording between the present Act and the rent con-
trol sustained by the Supreme Court in Block v. Hirsh.56 The
latter stated that the rent should be "fair and reasonable." In
Helena Rubenstein, Inc. v. Charline's Cut Rates, Inc., 57 a case
arising under the current Act, it was stated that the war
power of Congress may be exercised under a price fixing
statute where the public interest in the preventing of inflation
so demands.
The question of due process may also arise over the prob-
lems of hearing and procedure. The Emergency Price Control
Act does not provide for a hearing before a regulation is
promulgated. Price control is a quasi-legislative function and
52 United States & Roach v. Johnson, 11 Law Week 4420 (1943).
53 290 U. S. 398, 78 L. Ed. 413; 88 A. L. R. 1481 (1934).
54 Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332; 61 L. Ed. 755; L. R. A. 1917 E. 938 (1917).
55 47 F. Supp. 635 (1942).
56 256 U. S. 1385, 65 L. Ed. 865; 16 A. L. R. 165 (1929).
57 28 Atlantic 2d 113; 132 N J. eq. 254 (1942).
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thus it would seem that a hearing before enactment would
not be necessary.5 8
Another question of constitutionality arises over the
peculiar mode of appeal provided for in the Act. The Act sets
up an Emergency Court of Appeals. This Act also denies dis-
trict or circuit courts the right to issue injunctions prohibit-
ing enforcement of the statute pending litigation. This does
not present a serious problem, however. Inferior courts receive
their power and jurisdiction from Congress and by a like
token Congress can curtail this power. 59 Congress may at its
discretion create additional tribunals. As to injunctions, a
stay is not a matter of right even if irreparable injury might
result and is merely an exercise of "judicial discretion" and
the propriety of its issue ordinarily depends on circumstances.
In the recent case of Helena Rubenstein Inc. v. Charline's
Cut Rates Inc. 6O the complainant contested the Emergency
Price Control Act on the grounds that it impaired the obliga-
tions of its contracts made under the New Jersey Fair Trade
Act. There can be little consideration given to this contention
for two very important reasons. The constitutional provi-
sion 61 prohibiting the impairment of contracts is a prohibi-
tion upon the states only and where there is a conflict between
a federal and a state statute the federal will prevail under the
doctrine of federal supremacy.6 2
A still more serious constitutional problem arises over the
questions which may be judicially determined. The act states
that
no such regulation, order, or price schedule shall be enjoined or
set aside, in whole or in part, unless the complainant establishes
to the satisfaction of the court that the regulation, order or price
schedule is not in accordance with law or is arbitrary or capri-
cious.63
58 Bi-betallic Investment co. v. Colo. 239 U. S. 441 (1915); Norwegian Nitrogen
Prod. Co. v. U S. 288 U. S. 294 (1933).
59 Art. 3, See. 1 U. S. Constitution. See also Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-buiding
Corp. 303 U. S. 41, 82 L. Ed. 638 (1938).
60 132 N. T. eq. 254, 28 A. 2d 113 (1942).
61 Art. 1, Sec. 10 U. S. Constitution. See also Norman v. B & 0 R. R. Co. 294
U S. 240, 79 L. Ed. 885 (1935).
62 Art. 6, Sec. 2 U. S. Constitution.
63 50 U. S. C. A. App. Sec. 901-946.
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It would seem that any objection to this review would be based
upon the frequently discussed case of Ohio Valley Water Co.
v. Ben Avon Borrough.64 The courts have applied this rule,
however, only in public utility rate cases where the previously
discussed problem of a "fair return" is involved. The more
applicable rule in circumstances such as those presented by
the Emergency Price Control Act is that pronounced in
American Telephone and Telegraph Company v. United
States 65 where the court stated:
This court is not at liberty to substitute its own discretion for
that of administrative powers. To show that these have been'
exceeded in the field of action here involved, it is not enough that
the prescribed system of accounts shall appear to be unwise or
burdensome or inferior to another. Error or wisdom is not equiv-
alent to abuse. What has been ordered must appear to be 'so
entirely at odds with fundamental accounting.' 66 as to be an
expression of a whim rather than an exercise of a. judgment.
The most serious constitutional question to arise under
the Emergency Price Control Act arises under the problem of
delegation of legislative power. A survey of recent decisions
discloses two Federal district courts which have arrived at
opposite decisions on this point.67 Both of these litigations
arose over the rent control feature of the Act and one is now
before the United States Supreme Court.
The problem of delegation of power arises from the doc-
trine of separation of powers. The framers of our Constitu-
tion were strongly influenced by Montesquieu and Locke. As
a result of this the belief that the legislative, exeecutive and
judicial functions of government should be separate was firmly
implanted in our governmental structure. This is true not only
in the federal government but also in the state governments. 6s
This doctrine of separation must be correctly understood.
Authority to perform ministerial functions may be delegated
64 253 U. S. 187, 64 L. Ed. 908 (1920).
65 299 U. S. 232, 81 L. Ed. 142 (1936).
66 Kansas City S. R. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 423 58 L. Ed. 296; 34 S.
Ct. 125; 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1. (1913).
67 Henderson v. Kimmel, 47 F. Supp. 635 (1942) Roach v. Johnson, 48 F. Supp.
843 (1943).
68 Constitutions of twenty-eight states implicitly provide for separation and it
is found by implication in constitutions of the other states.
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to administrative agencies without constitutional difficulty,
as these acts are not of legislative or judicial nature.
In considering the true test as to whether a power is strict-
ly legislative, or whether it is administrative and merely
relates to the execution of the law, Justice Ranney stated:
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of law. The first cannot be done.
To the latter no valid objection can be made.69
The most important case to arise under the question of
delegation of power is the famous "Sick Chicken case" 70 but
the Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 71 case was the first case to
declare unconstitutional an Act of Congress solely on the
grounds of improper delegation of power. In this case the sole
question evolved around the right of Congress to authorize the
President to prohibit the transportation in interstate com-
merce of petroleum produced in excess of a state-fived quota.
Here both the majority opinion by Justice Hughes and the
minority opinion by Justice Cardoza agreed as to the necessity
for administrative law and as the necessity for standards set
up by Congress. They .disagreed as to whether there actually
were such standards. The majority opinion looked only to the
section 72 authorizing the President to act and found no stand-
ards. Justice Cardoza, however, looked to the entire statute and
found what he thought was sufficient standard implied from
the title section 19 which stated that the President was to pro-
hibit such transportation when he believes it is necessary to
eliminate unfair competition, to conserve natural resources or
to promote the fullest possible utilization of the present pro-
ductive capacities of industries.
In the Schlechter case 73 which declared the National
Recovery Act unconstitutional by a unanimous court it was
found that the only attempt by Congress to set up a standard
was that the President was authorized to establish codes of
69 Cincinnati, W & Z R. Co. v. Clinton Co. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77 (1852).
70 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935).
71 293 U. S. 398 79 L. Ed. 446 (1935).
72 15 U. S. C. A. Sec. 709 (c).
73 295 U. S. 495; 79; 79 L. Ed. 15,0 (1935).
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"fair competition." The court ruled that this was not such a
standard as to constitute a proper delegation of power.
Another important case, and one evolving the question of
price -control, is Carter v. Carter Coal Co.74 wherein the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 was declared uncon-
stitutional. By this Act, Congress delegated to the producers
of two-thirds of the tonnage and to one-half the miners the
power to fix maximum hours for the entire industry. This bill
also contained *a price fixing provision which the majority of
the court refused to separate from the labor provision. Justice
Hughes while concurring as to the unconstitutionality of the
labor provision felt the two provisions were separable while
Justice Cardoza, with Justices Stone and Brandeis concurring,
wrote a frequently-quoted dissent upholding the constitution-
ality of both provisions.
Having examined the more important decisions which
ruled various attempts by Congress to set up standards as
being insufficient we must now view other equally important
and later cases in which similar standards were upheld. In Sun-
shine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,75 a case arising under
the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, the court held there was not
an illegal delegation of power where the Act provided that the
Commission could fix rates when in the public interest it is
necessary to protect the consumer against unreasonably high
prices. Under the Act these maximum prices had to be fixed at
a uniform increases above minimum prices so that in aggre-
gate they will yield a reasonable return above the weighted
average total cost of the district; and no maximum price shall
be established for any mine which will not yield a fair return
on the fair value of the property. In this case the court stated
that
the standards which Congress has provided for exceeds in speci-
ficity others which have been sustained. Certainly in the hands
of experts the criterial which Congress has supplied are wholly
adequate for carrying out the general policy and purpose of the
Act. To require more would be to insist on a degree of exactitude
which does not comport with the requirements of administrative
process.
74 298 U. S. 238; 80 L. Ed. 1160 (1936).
'75 310 U. S. 381; 84 L. Ed. 1263 (1940).
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Probably the most important recent decision upholding a
rather broad delegation of power is the Opp Cotton Mills Inc.
v. Administrator.76 Under the Fair Labor Standards Act 77
the administrator is authorized to fix minimum wages between
30 and 40, cents per hour. The Act states that the policy of
the statute is to 40-cents-per-hour limit "as rapidly as econom-
ically feasible without substantially curtailing employment"
and in each industry the standards of the administrative action
applicable to the Administrator are those made applicable to
the Industrial Committee of that industry which it is provided,
"shall recommend to the Administrator the highest minimum
wage rates for the industry which it determines,, having due
regard to economic and competitive conditions, will not curtail
employment in the industry." The statute states that in mak-
ing their determination the committee and the Administrator
must consider "among other relevant factors" competitive
conditions as affected by transportation, living and production
costs, and the wage scale for comparable work established by
collective bargaining labor agreements, and by employers who
voluntarily maintain minimum wage standards in the indus-
try. In upholding this delegation of power the court stated:
The essentials of the legislative function are the determination
of the legislative policy and its formation as a rule of conduct.
These essentials are preserved when Congress specifies the basic
conclusions of facts upon ascertainment of which, from relevant
data by a designated administrative agency, it ordains that its
statutory command is to be effective.
While it perhaps is true that in the more recent of these
decisions the court has taken a more friendly attitude toward
administrative agencies, nevertheless we can note a clear dis-
tinction between the standards set up in the National Recov-
ery Act,78 and those set up in the Fair Labor Standards Act.79
This distinction is simply that the legislature cannot delegate
its power to make a law, but it can make a law wherein it dele-
gates a power to determine some fact upon which the law
intends to make its own action depend. We can now examine
76 312 U. S. 126; 85 L. Ed. 624 (1914).
77 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, U. S. C. A. 29 U. S. C. A. § 201.
78 15 U.S.C.A. 701.
79 29 U.S.C.A. 201.
80 50 U.S.C.A. App. Sec. 901.
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the Emergency Price Control Act 80 and determine if it con-
forms to this principle.
In Roach v. Johnson.81 A Case arising over the rent con-
trol provision of the Emergency Price Control Act 82 the court
in declaring the act unconstitutional stated that the order of
the Administrator contained no finding of facts and on the
further that the act while authorizing the Administrator to
make "such studies and investigations and to obtain such
information as he deems necessary" does not compel him to
do so and that in the particular case he did not in fact do so.
The order of the Administrator is quasi-legislative. It is not
necessary that a hearing be given before the order is origin-
ally promulgated.8 3 The Act does provide for a hearing after
an order of the administrator has been set down. These hear-
ings are quasi-legislative and need not meet the constitutional
requirements that are necessary in a quasi-judicial hearing.8 4
Further the statute sets up as a standard a certain date period
upon which the administrator is to base his present orders.
The administrator can make exceptions to this when it would
be inequitable to follow this standard. The bill provides that
any agrieved party may file a protest with Administrator. The
Administrator must 'then either grant or deny the protest,
notice the protest for hearing or provide opportunity for pre-
senting further evidence. If the protest is denied the Admin-
istrator must inform the protestant of the grounds upon
which the denial is based. A party denied their protest may
appeal to the Emergency court of Appeals provided for in the
Act.
In Henderson v. Kimmel85 the court takes a more practical
and modern view of the problem. In this case the court empha-
sized the similarity of the Standards 'used in this case and,
those provided for in a Rent Control Act for the District of
Columbia which was upheld in Block v. Hirsh.86 The court
further based its opinion on the recent United States v. Rock
81 48 F. Supp. 833 (1943).
82 U.S.C.A. Fit 50 App. §902.
83 Commonwealth v. Sission, 189 Mass. 247, 75 N.E. 619 (1905).
84 Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Colorado 239 U.S. 441, 60 L. Ed. 372 (1915).
85 47 F. Supp. 635 (1942).
86 256 U.S. 135, 65, L. Ed. 865 (1921). The present act states rent fixed shall be
generally "fair and equitable. The prior act stated the rent should be "fair and reason-
able."
50 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Royal Co-operative Inc.8 7 and Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Admin-
istrator 88 wherein the court stated that if Congress states the
purpose to be accomplished and the standards by which the
purpose is to be attained with sufficient exactness to be under-
standable by those affected it need specify only so far as is
reasonably practicable. In view of past price-control legisla-
tion, the weight of judicial authority and the realization of
the growing need of administrative agencies it would seem
that the court in Henderson v. Kimmell arrived at the more
satisfactory conclusion.
After considering the various possible constitutional prob-
lems to be encountered in Emergency Price Act there seems
little question that the Act as it is at present written is within
constitutional bounds.
CONCLUSION
In summarizing the problem of Price Control one observes
in the past price control was only attempted in times of emer-
gency. In recent years, however, both the state and national
government have attempted to regulate prices in particular
fields and on limited scale irregardless of the normalory of
the periods. The present emergency has resulted in the estab-
lishment of the broadest-price control program ever attempted
in this country; While this program receives its authority
from the War Powers clause and examination of the Constitu-
tion discloses that such a program could be predicated upon
other clauses of the Constitution.
While Price Control in ordinary times might seem like a
drastic departure from a program of "free enterprise" we have
already by other methods -of control made many such depart-
ures. With the ever increasing complexities of our problems
even more drastic departures are not unforeseeable. Price
Control as a permanent policy of government might well be
one of these steps from the simple, uncontrolled economy of
the past.
Bernard F. Grainey
University of Notre Dame
87 307 U.S. 533, 83 L. Ed. 1446 (1939).
88 312 U.S. 126, (1941).
